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Abstract - The development of unmanned vehicle technology 
is rapidly proceeding and will result in numerous advances in 
autonomous vehicles.  Most of the research effort to date focuses 
on the safe and effective operation of these vehicles that will allow 
them to integrate into society.  A research gap exists though in 
the technical, policy, and legal fields regarding illicit use of these 
vehicles beyond their programmed functions.  In this paper we 
explore possible misuse of unmanned vehicles and illustrate the 
need for research in the technical, policy, and legal realms.   
Keywords -  Unmanned Vehicles, Cyber Security, Cyber Policy, 
Cyber Law 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Unmanned, autonomous vehicles of all types, e.g., air, 
ground, water, are rapidly advancing in capability.  Plentiful 
research is ongoing to solve the challenges of safe operation for 
these systems in our complex environment.  This research is 
necessary for the eventual inclusion of these systems into 
society.  With that task now well underway, it is time to shift 
some research effort into other aspects of unmanned systems 
such as security and privacy.  Before these systems begin mass 
production, it would be wise for society to develop rules and 
regulations protecting both public safety and privacy.  As we 
have seen with other systems, it is more efficient to create 
designs from the ground up that provide these protections 
instead of attempting to patch them once fielded.  Many in 
industry would argue to develop then regulate similar to how 
the automobile and aviation industries developed.  However, 
this method often results in long periods of anguish for users as 
issues are slowly resolved.  Failure to develop solutions to 
these issues now will eventually result in the use of unmanned 
vehicles (UVs) in ways that are harmful to society. 
As new technology is developed, it often provides benefits 
to society.  It enables people to be more productive, to work 
more safely, and to live healthier lives.  Frequently though, this 
same technology is co-opted for battlefield or criminal use.  
Cell phones enable remote triggering of bombs or the illicit 
tracking of people [1]. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are 
used to deliver explosives as documented in attacks by ISIS 
and the recent assassination attempt in Venezuela.  Social 
media provides command and control networks and recruiting 
tools for Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists.  Internet of Things (IOT) 
devices facilitate massive Distributed Denial of Services 
Attacks [2].  GPS devices are used to stalk people [3].  
Eventually unmanned vehicles will be utilized by criminals or 
terrorists for nefarious purposes as well.   
Some of the illicit applications for unmanned vehicles may 
affect privacy and personal freedoms while others may pose a 
direct threat to public safety.  Many questions arise from these 
possibilities such as how will stalking or harassment by 
unmanned vehicles be prevented?  Will citizens be protected 
from constant surveillance that these technologies enable?  
How will law enforcement or the military stop an unmanned 
vehicle and how will it gain authorization to search it?  How 
will the perpetrator of an illegal act using an unmanned vehicle 
be attributed?  The answers to these questions and many 
similar ones are currently unknown.  The purpose of this paper 
is to propose the start of the discussion on these topics 
including potential technical, legal, and policy solutions to 
these issues so that the solutions are emplaced prior to mass 
adoption of these technologies. 
To initiate the discussion, the remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 discusses work related to 
unmanned vehicles and public safety/privacy.  In section 3, we 
will use several scenarios to illustrate the gaps in current 
research work and the legal/policy domain.  Finally, we will 
conclude the paper in Section 4. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The work of Schlag discusses the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles by the government to conduct near constant 
surveillance of individuals [4]. The author proposes a 
consumer protection law that would designate authorized uses 
of unmanned aerial vehicles by the government and 
individuals. In his opinion, this law should help define the 
public’s expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance by 
drones.  This work is a step in the right direction but is focused 
on aerial vehicles only and on the protection of individual 
privacy from the government, not privacy protection writ large. 
Work is being done by a group at IBM to develop the 
concept of a digital manifest for unmanned aerial vehicles [5].  
The views of the author are his own and do not reflect the views of the 
United States Military Academy, the United States Army, or the United 
States Government. 
This work proposes a technical solution to implement an 
unmanned aerial vehicle manifest for onboard goods. The 
manifest includes details about the origin and destination of the 
vehicle and a listing of contents that could be displayed on the 
vehicle or a remote terminal.  The intent of this manifest 
though is to assist an organization with the logistical challenges 
of creating shipments, assigning transport, and then delivering 
the goods. The manifest is not intended for use by law 
enforcement. 
The author of [6] imagines scenarios that may result in law 
enforcement stops of an autonomous ground vehicle.  The 
scenarios include events such as passengers not wearing seat 
belts, a vehicle that is reported stolen, and broken equipment.  
These scenarios are the beginning of a more thorough 
investigation into how unmanned systems may be used by 
malevolent actors but it does not include scenarios such as 
terrorist use of a vehicle.  Furthermore, as highlighted in the 
article, the authorities of law enforcement personnel to search 
the vehicle are not fully defined and require the development of 
policy and legal solutions. 
In the article by Sullivan [7], the actions by states such as 
California are highlighted.  California is proposing laws that 
require autonomous vehicles to have “law enforcement 
interaction plans.”  Developers of these systems would be 
required to assist law enforcement by identifying vehicle 
ownership and insurance.  The open legal question is can a 
manufacturer be forced to provide this information on a 
privately owned vehicle?  Again, these draft laws demonstrate 
some initial thought on how autonomous vehicles operate in a 
complex society, but they are not inclusive of all vehicle types 
nor do they examine the most dangerous scenarios. 
Kaminiski illustrates how many states are considering 
privacy rules with respect to unmanned aerial vehicles [8].  The 
range of state draft regulations on privacy in this area range 
from treatment of surveillance in public areas as free speech to 
more conservative approaches that require a subject’s consent 
under various circumstances.  A main point is that there is no 
federal standard and only UAVs are considered in these 
regulations.  Additionally, most of these laws deal with 
government surveillance drones and do not concern themselves 
with citizen owned systems. 
 The MCity project attempts to foresee challenges with 
regard to autonomous automobiles [9]. One of the products 
they have released is a threat assessment tool to assist in 
determining how vulnerable autonomous vehicles are to cyber-
attacks. Though the authors hypothesize about various 
scenarios driverless vehicles could encounter, they only 
propose possible technical solutions.  Their work lacks non-
technical issue identification and only considers automobiles. 
III. IDENTIFYING TECHNICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY GAPS 
It is clear that researchers are thinking about some of the 
potential issues that unmanned vehicles will unearth.  
However, most of the work deals with unmanned aerial 
vehicles and how unmanned systems interact with the 
government.  Given that drones are now proliferate, this seems 
reasonable.  We propose that now is the time to begin research 
and have discussions on all unmanned autonomous systems 
and to extend that discussion beyond the government/public 
interface.  To assist in starting this discussion, we present the 
following scenarios grouped into three main categories of 
potential UV exploitation: the Normal UV, the Hacked UV, 
and the Intrusive UV. 
A. The Normal UV 
The first category is UVs that are co-opted during the 
completion of their normal tasks. The vehicle’s programmed 
behavior and design attributes are used to commit criminal, 
terrorist, or other illegal acts.  This is illustrated in The Bomb 
and The Criminal where well-behaved, normally operating 
systems facilitate crime or acts of terrorism. 
1) The Bomb 
One evening, a food delivery robot makes a delivery to a 
new customer.  The robot makes its way through various 
neighborhoods without difficulty passing several important 
government facilities and even a few law enforcement 
personnel.  The now common presence of these robots and its 
good behavior presents no cause for intervention in its 
operation.  At its destination, the food is accepted and payment 
is made as normal.  During the robot’s return trip, it suddenly 
explodes outside of a local government office.  Investigators 
later conclude that the new customer deposited the explosive 
inside the robot knowing that its return path would take it by 
the desired target.  Using a gps device to trigger the bomb and 
the robot’s deterministically determined return path, the goal 
of the terrorist was achieved.   
Unmanned, autonomous delivery systems are currently 
developed and in some cases in use [10]–[13].  The research 
behind these systems includes the technical challenges of 
navigation, collision avoidance, and the exchange of goods.  
Items such as how users gain access to system compartments 
have various solutions [10], [12], [14]. The challenges facing 
autonomous systems are being solved and once conquered, 
laws and regulations will most likely evolve to allow their use 
in public.  Before this happens, we need to explore the 
scenarios for misuse to help design prevention mechanisms. 
In this type of scenario, the unmanned system could have 
many forms such as a taxi, a delivery vehicle, or a service 
vehicle (e.g., a trash truck).  The system in question could be 
used passively like the delivery vehicle in the scenario.  The 
threat actors merely utilize the access granted to them and 
publicly available knowledge of its operations to achieve their 
goal.  Alternatively, the system could be partly or completely 
modified by the threat actor.  In this situation, perhaps the 
controller software is hacked to give control to the actor or the 
system’s sensors are modified or spoofed to provide the 
controlling system false sensor data.  
Some of the research issues that arise from this scenario 
include how to interrogate an unmanned system remotely to 
determine its contents and mission.  If the system is suspicious 
or deemed a threat, how is the system disabled or stopped?  
How is a criminal act attributed to the threat actor?  The issues 
are multi-faceted and include technical, legal, and policy 
components.  There is no single, easy solution. 
 Some technical solutions that assist in documenting system 
contents and mission are found in the ideas in [5], [15], [16].  
In the first solution, the legal marijuana industry is developing 
digital manifests for law enforcement and auditing purposes.  
The second solution is a proposed idea to create digital 
manifests that will help companies’ logistical systems match 
cargo to delivery systems. The last solution is an e-manifest 
proposed by the EPA for hazardous waste cargos.  This system 
could allow for a check on potentially dangerous vehicles and 
their routes.  None of these solutions are sufficient to deal with 
our scenario though.  Manifests are not currently a requirement 
for any unmanned systems and even those in the manned 
systems world are usually only subject to inspection under 
certain circumstances.  Clearly more research work is needed 
to develop solutions for these questions. 
2) The Criminal 
An autonomous taxi drives to a requested passenger pick-
up site.  Upon arrival, it opens its doors to allow the passenger 
to enter.  Instead of a passenger boarding, a package is placed 
into the vehicle.  The vehicle then departs for its requested 
destination.  At that location, the doors open and the package 
is removed by an unidentified individual.  Unknown to the 
proprietor of the taxi, the vehicle has just facilitated the 
transportation of illegal substances.  The account of the 
requesting rider is spoofed and the identities of the highly 
concealed originating and receiving agents is unknown.   
In the present day, moving vehicles always have at least 
one passenger - the operator.  As such, law enforcement has the 
ability to stop a vehicle, potentially search it, and if appropriate 
hold the operator responsible for any violations of the law.  In a 
world of fully autonomous vehicles, this may no longer be true.  
It is feasible that vehicles will not only be driverless, but also 
without passengers.  A vehicle could be used solely as a 
delivery means for cargo.  A UV could be sent to the dry 
cleaners to pick-up an individual’s clothing and then return 
with the cargo.  In this scenario, who is responsible if the cargo 
has illegal contents?  Currently, many laws for vehicles are 
based upon a driver being in control, and often require a 
determination of intent [17]. How will this occur in a 
passenger-less vehicle? 
One of the first challenges is to attribute ownership of the 
vehicle.  This may be required to identify who is responsible 
for the illegal action or if a vehicle is authorized to be in a 
restricted location.  A lot of effort is underway with regard to 
identification of UAVs [18]–[21].  These efforts rely on 
wireless transmitters and receivers that can interrogate drones 
to determine ownership. So far, this effort has not been 
extended to UGVs.  Even with this technology, is it proper to 
hold the owner responsible for the illegal act?  What 
technology needs to be emplaced to protect the owner from 
these scenarios? If the owner is not responsible, how are all 
interactions with the vehicle attributed in such a way that a 
credible chain of responsibility is maintained?  One suggestion 
is that vehicle trips require "signatures" for programmed 
route/destination instructions thus providing a log as to who is 
responsible for the journey [17].  Without some form of 
identifying technology, do police have the right to demand 
vehicle data from the owner or manufacturer?  Questions like 
these are why some states, such as California, are requiring law 
enforcement interaction plans when laws for autonomous 
vehicles are being developed [7].   
Another issue is what authorities does law enforcement 
have to stop a suspicious vehicle?  With a human driven 
vehicle, pre-textual stops based on driving behavior such as 
excessive speed, lane departure, or failure to signal provide an 
avenue.  These human errors will largely disappear if the 
promised super-driving capabilities of autonomous vehicles is 
delivered [22].  Some pre-textual stops may still be valid 
though such as those based on broken equipment or expired 
registration [6].    Reasonable suspicion is often enough to stop 
a vehicle [23] as well.  However, what now provides the basis 
for that suspicion?  The route a vehicle takes may simply be a 
function of its navigation algorithm and may no longer indicate 
potential misdeeds.  Observation of the driver or passengers 
when the vehicle is empty is no longer a basis for suspicion.  
Some basis for stops will certainly remain, but the frequency of 
such stops is sure to decrease [23]. 
If a vehicle is stopped, what authority does law 
enforcement have to search it?  How can consent to search be 
obtained if no owner/operator is present (with or without 
passengers)?  Currently the driver is usually the individual who 
can grant consent for a search.  With the potential that there is 
no driver, how will laws change to grant search consent?  
Could the owner of the vehicle grant consent remotely?  Could 
states create laws that designate implied consent for search of 
autonomous vehicles similar to searches that are done with 
breath, blood, and saliva samples for suspected intoxicated 
drivers?  What will be considered probable cause for search 
without consent?  The “reason for arrest” often provides law 
enforcement the mechanism to search for evidence [6].   Will 
the records of a vehicle’s trips be searchable without warrant?  
Autonomous vehicles are likely to store this information 
locally or remotely so will that be considered “open 
information” [22]?  These are just a few of the legal and 
regulatory issues that need to be examined prior to widespread 
UV deployment. 
B. The Hacked UV 
The second category that we examine is UVs used 
maliciously through hacking or other means of modification to 
alter their normal operation.  This is described in the 
Bludgeon, the Plug, and the Kidnapper.  These scenarios show 
what is possible if the hardware, software, or sensing 
capabilities of the UV are altered to allow the attacker to 
control or change the behavior of the UV.  Once the attacker 
alters the UV, it can potentially participate in nefarious acts. 
 
1) The Bludgeon 
An autonomous ground vehicle drives up to a busy 
intersection and stops at the red light.  As pedestrians enter 
the crosswalk in front of it, it suddenly accelerates into the 
crowd striking multiple persons.  It then proceeds inexplicably 
to drive onto the nearby sidewalk striking more pedestrians 
until it finally crashes into a building.  The forensics team 
concludes that the navigation system and key sensors have 
been modified thus overriding the system’s normal safety 
protocols.  It appears that talented hackers have gained 
access to the internals of the vehicle. 
Any system that is operated through the use of computer 
code and electronics is potentially vulnerable to this type of 
scenario.  As was seen with the Jeep hack of 2016 [24], 
vehicles are no exception to this problem.  Altering the 
operations of autonomous vehicles from exploiting code to 
simply modifying the sensors (ex. painting the camera lens) to 
modifying the environment (ex. placing tape on portions of a 
Stop sign to fool visual recognition) can take various levels of 
effort and expertise.  No matter the technique, a UV could be 
altered to respond in this increasingly popular terrorist act.  
Presently, an operator is the main mechanism for 
preventing these types of occurrences.  The operator is in a 
position to prevent or stop modification of the vehicle while 
they are present.  When not present, they have the 
responsibility to check the vehicle’s condition before 
operation.  So, without the operator, how do we know the 
vehicle is not altered?  How does the user/operator know that 
the state of all embedded software is unaltered prior to 
driving?  What tools can be developed and emplaced that 
allow civilians and law enforcement to visually or digitally 
know the vehicle is operating within its designed 
specifications?  What requirements should be placed on 
manufacturers to develop prevention mechanisms?  What 
liability should be attributed to the vehicle owner if it is 
operated while altered? Should government create geofences 
of areas and require vehicle manufacturers to enforce 
compliance with these no-travel zones?  The answer to all of 
these questions deserve research and discussion before an 
enterprising terrorist compromises a UV. 
2) The Plug 
While driving South out of Washington, D.C. early one 
Friday evening, the traffic is worse than normal.  Listening to 
the traffic report on the radio, drivers are told of several 
vehicles stopped in a row across all lanes of the road.  No 
drivers are reported in the vehicles, and no drivers were seen 
exiting the parked cars.  After the cars were removed from the 
road and forensic investigation completed, it was discovered 
that the vehicles were remotely piloted to the highway.  Once 
the vehicles were lined up side-by-side, the attackers stopped 
the vehicles in the road, preventing traffic from moving. 
Similar to hacking the vehicle in The Bludgeon scenario, 
several vehicles could cooperate to disrupt traffic.  This could 
be a scenario where the vehicles drive slowly or are 
completely stopped.  Consider a section of road with concrete 
barriers on one side, and a natural barrier on the other side 
(mountain, cliff, water, etc.).  California State Route 1, a 
major highway along the Pacific Ocean, is an example of such 
a road.  If an attacker were able to commandeer some 
unmanned vehicles, they would be able to prevent traffic flow 
in either direction.  This could potentially be done with a 
single vehicle if parked across a two-lane road with no way to 
drive around the vehicle.  The Golden Gate Bridge in San 
Francisco connects State Route 1 north and south of the 
bridge.  Using six commandeered vehicles would allow the 
attacker to block all the lanes of the Golden Gate Bridge, 
effectively disrupting up to 112,000 vehicles per day (source: 
http://goldengatebridge.org/tolls_traffic/).  New York City is 
another example where an attacker could seriously impact 
traffic patterns using a few cars to block one or more major 
bridges or tunnels into the city. 
All states have traffic laws requiring vehicles driving 
slower than the normal speed to use the farthest right lane, and 
several states now have laws requiring vehicles to move from 
the far left, or passing, lane if a faster moving vehicle 
approaches [25].  The laws are based on section 11-304 of the 
Uniform Vehicle Code, a set of recommendations initially 
developed for national standards for states to use [26].  How 
will law enforcement officials engage with a vehicle violating 
traffic laws, such as speeding or driving too slowly?  A 
Google self-driving car was pulled over for driving too slowly 
in 2015 [27], although no ticket was issued by the officer.  [6] 
provides several examples where a UV might be pulled over, 
but what if the vehicle does not respond to the flashing lights 
of the police officer? 
3) The Kidnapper 
During a routine maintenance service for an unmanned 
aerial system (UAS), a new “feature” is added that allows an 
attacker to take control of the vehicle, in the same way that 
researchers took control of ground vehicles in a 2015 and 
2017 story in Wired magazine [24], [28].  During a routine 
trip to work, the vehicle turns off course, carrying the 
passenger to an isolated location.  Communications on board 
the vehicle, including voice and live video, are used to send a 
ransom note to the victim’s family.  
This scenario can be extended to ransom in other forms, 
such as preventing operation of the vehicle, putting the 
occupant in physical danger.  Just as hospitals and home users 
are encountering ransomware in their networked systems, UVs 
can fall prey to this attack as well. 
Several companies around the world are currently testing 
working prototypes for UAVs which will function as air taxis 
in cities, carrying passengers from roof top to roof top [29]–
[33]. One author discusses six different companies with 
prototype unmanned aerial systems (UAS).  Feist states “the 
technology is ready, but the legal systems and safety for 
passengers and people below have a long way to go yet.” [30] 
He does not expect to see active air taxi systems in the United 
States before 2020; however, Dubai, in the United Arab 
Emirates, is pushing to have active systems before that, hoping 
to be the first city in the world with autonomous air taxis.  
Other experts consider a more reasonable timeframe for 
ground vehicles to be 2030 [34], while more recent predictions 
place the date as sometime in 2021 [35]. 
The technology to operate a UAS may be ready, but to 
maintain safety and control of a high density of vehicles is not.  
NASA is working on a system to handle a high density of 
UAS, partnering with Uber to collect data.  The system is the 
UAS Traffic Management (UMT) network 
(https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/index.shtml). [31] 
If autonomous vehicles, whether air, ground, or sea 
variant, can be compromised and remotely controlled by an 
attacker, what can technology, policy and law do to prevent or 
mitigate the damage?  Can the occupant of the vehicle always 
have manual override of the vehicle?  Or will some form of a 
“big red button” that puts the vehicle in a safe shutdown mode 
be mandated? 
C. The Intrusive UV 
Lastly, we examine UVs that are operated by their owner to 
perform legal, yet obtrusive and persistent surveillance of a 
target, potentially violating individual privacy norms. The 
Private Investigator and the Stalker are examples of this type of 
UV exploitation. The ability of UVs to operate in public spaces 
for extended durations may create an opportunity to infringe on 
individual privacy that are not easily achieved in the present 
day. 
1) The Private Investigator 
A private investigator is hired by a citizen to monitor the 
actions of a selected individual. The investigator has 
unmanned aerial and unmanned ground systems at her 
disposal.  Unlike in years past when the investigator’s 
surveillance was limited to their personal time investment, 
these new tools allow for constant surveillance of the target.  
Ground systems monitor the target’s home and workplace 
positioning themselves legally in public spaces.  Aerial vehicles 
monitor all of the target’s travels.  There is no escaping the 
unblinking eye of the unmanned vehicles and their cameras 
and microphones. 
Issues with regard to unmanned vehicles, mostly aerial, 
have been well examined in the courts and this examination 
will continue for the near future [36]–[39]. These cases 
primarily deal with the issue of privacy with regard to the 
government and the Fourth Amendment. The issue of the 
legality of private citizens conducting surveillance on other 
private citizens without their consent is not well explored. 
When privacy is potentially violated by the government, the 
salient issues revolve around factors such as the duration of the 
surveillance, whether it is recorded, if the technology is 
commercially available, whether the area of observation is in 
the curtilage of the home, and if magnification/augmentation is 
used.  A popular framework used in some of these cases to 
determine the legality of the surveillance is the “Mosaic 
theory.”  This suggests that a single person’s view of an 
individual's movements over a period of time is limited and 
therefore an expectation of movement privacy exists with 
regard to that person [40].  Our scenario would fail the Mosaic 
theory test.  Clearly the targeted individual is under constant 
surveillance and has no privacy of movement.  Despite this, the 
actions of the investigator would not be illegal because it’s not 
the government conducting the surveillance. 
The authors in [39] maintain that even if the government is 
involved,  the concept of "open fields", public areas and private 
property that "do not provide the setting for those intimate 
activities that the Fourth Amendment is intended to shelter 
from government interference or surveillance", allow legal 
surveillance.  The private investigator in this scenario will 
often be conducting their work in these open fields.  
Additionally, in the case of US v Vela, it was ruled that using 
night vision goggles to see into a vehicle on a public road was 
allowable thus reinforcing the idea that surveillance in public 
was o.k. even for the government [41].  Certainly if the 
government is allowed to surveil individuals in public spaces, 
then private citizens must be able to do it too.  The question 
remains though, is this something that we wish to condone?  
Should the Mosaic theory apply to civilian surveillance?  Can 
citizens seek relief from the unwanted surveillance? 
Some government agencies are providing a possible path in 
this area.  The United Kingdom's Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 requires permission for a UAS to 
record surveillance of a residential premise or private vehicle 
and that surveillance system operations must notify individuals 
of its operation so that copies can be requested if desired [42].  
Indiana state law makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to place a 
data recording device on another's property without consent (no 
mention of public spaces) [43].  States such as Texas and 
Missouri have considered laws prohibiting video of an 
individual’s property without their consent [8].  Clearly there is 
some concern for the privacy of individuals regardless of 
government involvement.  As such, coherent policies and 
regulations need to be developed to cope with the surveillance 
powers that unmanned vehicles provide citizens. 
2) The Stalker 
An individual becomes interested in the activities of another 
person.  He desires to not only monitor what that person does 
and when, but also to disrupt their life.  He directs unmanned 
aerial vehicles to constantly fly nearby the target creating 
noise pollution and recording all visible activity, some of which 
is later posted on social media.  Ground vehicles follow the 
target and occasionally impede the free movement of the 
person.  Other ground vehicles position themselves outside the 
person’s home and flood the wifi channel that the target’s 
home router occupies thus limiting their ability to use the 
internet.  Finally, unmanned vehicles direct lights and lasers 
into the windows of the target’s home at night making it 
difficult to rest yet not violating any noise statutes. 
This scenario shares some of the features of the private 
investigator. The individual using the unmanned vehicles is not 
a government official.  The vehicles remain within public 
spaces and thus are not trespassing.  Deliberate attention is paid 
to avoid violating local laws.  The main difference here is the 
intent of the stalker. 
Technology is advancing quickly that provides features 
enabling this scenario.  A Google patent granted in 2015 [44] 
describes a UAV system equipped with Automatic Target 
Recognition and tracking.  This technology could enable a 
UAV owner to autonomously identify and follow their prey 
without the interaction of a pilot.  Additionally, the authors of 
[45] describe an autonomous patrol system that is capable of 
stalking ground-based personnel.  Certainly the context of both 
these systems is initially military in nature but as we have seen, 
military technology frequently becomes civilian technology as 
time passes.   
Given current and future technology, what protections 
should individuals have against unmanned vehicle 
stalking/harassment?  The limitation of the stalker’s time is no 
longer a limiting factor on the harassment.  A stalker can be 
issued a restraining order but how would that apply to 
unmanned vehicles?  Adding to the difficulty of developing 
policies and regulations to deal with this type of scenario is the 
fact that anti-stalking laws are mostly a local affair.  
Definitions of stalking vary, but terms such as willful, 
malicious, repeated, unwanted are used in many.  Intent, actual 
harm done, and the perception of a “reasonable person” also 
factor into these laws [46].  Overall, the lack of federal laws 
regarding stalking create a challenging environment to regulate 
unmanned vehicle use in these cases. 
Despite this difficulty, it is clear that some action is being 
taken. Cases in Arizona, Colorado, and Wisconsin have 
resulted in individuals being punished for using technology 
such as GPS trackers placed surreptitiously on vehicles to stalk 
others [3].  As unmanned technology becomes more readily 
available to the public, society needs to determine how it will 
cope with its capabilities in these unforeseen scenarios. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
While experts argue about the exact timeframe for 
autonomous systems to be commonplace, they do agree that 
these systems are an eventuality. Technology is making rapid 
progress, but our policies and laws have not kept pace.  Will 
manufacturers be allowed to place these systems in to 
operation as soon as they are ready, or will the legal system 
prevent them from operating until policy makers can decide 
how to emplace safety measures and other controls in place?  
Legal and policy regulations regarding liability may prevent 
the implementation of unmanned vehicles [35]. 
 Eventually, these systems will be commonplace in our 
society.  To avoid misuse of these UVs, it is time to research 
and discuss solutions to potential problems such as those 
mentioned in this work.  We cannot afford to “develop and 
then regulate” given the potential for harm.  Scientists, policy 
makers, and legal experts must unite to focus on prevention. 
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